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ORDERING THE ELEPHANTS TO DANCE:
CONSENT DECREES AND
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR*
JOSEPH F. DIMENTO ** AND
DEAN W. HESTERMANN***
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts cannot foresee every consequence of their action upon initial
intervention in a dispute. Often the actual effect of the court's solution
differs from the intended result. For example, in theory, a consent de-
cree should influence the behavior of targeted organizations to abide by
the law or carry out a proposed reform.' In practice, however, the
consent decree does not always influence group and organizational be-
havior in the positive manner advocated by students, scholars, and
public interest groups. This Article analyzes some of the organiza-
tional factors associated with the positive influence that consent de-
crees assert. This Article also acknowledges those organizational
factors that inhibit the attainment of the consent decree's intended
goals. This discussion relies on a consent decree case involving a con-
* The original research and some of the data on which this Article is based was
funded by a grant from the California Department of Transportation. Funding by The
John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation supported additional data
analyses and the writing of this Article.
** B.A. 1969, Harvard College; Ph.D, J.D., 1974 University of Michigan.
* Professor, University of California, Irvine (Criminology, Law & Society) B.A.
1984, Rhodes College; M.A., 1990 University of California, Irvine.
I. A consent decree is an agreement drafted by the parties, subject to judicial scr-
tiny and serves to resolve a dispute. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text for a
further description of the nature of consent decrees.
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troversy over a major urban freeway in California, the Century Free-
way or 1-105.2
Planning for the Century Freeway began in 1959 when the state leg-
islature added the route to the state's Freeway and Expressway System.
Engineering studies and right of way acquisition followed.3 By 1972,
the state possessed fifty-five percent of the needed right of way. In Feb-
ruary 1972 a lawsuit enjoined work on the freeway. Parties to the liti-
gation settled their dispute in 1979 and entered into a consent decree,4
which established institutions and procedures governing virtually every
aspect of this mammoth public works project.5 The parties amended
this decree in 1981.6
The story of the Century Freeway reflects a complex public policy
mechanism that is not well understood. The questions raised in the
literature, the state houses, and in the courts concerning the value of
consent decrees generally suggest why the Century Freeway consent
decree created significant controversy and proved difficult to
implement.
This Article first describes the consent decree as a tool for promoting
the implementation of public policy. Second, it summarizes the con-
sent decree's advantages and disadvantages as recognized in the litera-
ture. Third, it presents a brief summary of a case that illustrates a
highly ambitious legal mandate to a complex environment of new and
existing organizations. Next, the Article analyzes the treatment of one
set of factors that influences the successful implementation of a decree
- organizational and interorganizational dynamics. Finally, the Arti-
cle concludes by offering some public policy implications, based on or-
2. Joseph DiMento, Court Intervention, the Consent Decree and the Century Free-
way II-11 (Sept. 13, 1991) [hereinafter Final Report] (on file with the Washington Uni-
versity Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law). At the request of the State of
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), the author researched the history
of the Century Freeway and analyzed the impact of litigation on its construction.
Sources of data include interviews with key participants in the project, as well as other
public and institutional records.
3. Id. at 1I-11, 11-12.
4. Consent Decree, Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (No. 72-
355-HP) [hereinafter Final Consent Decree]. An amended decree, containing Appendi-
ces A, B, C and D, was entered on September 21, 1981. Amended Consent Decree,
Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (No. 72-355-HP) [hereinafter
Amended Consent Decree]. See infra note 74 for a description of the four appendices.
5. Id. at (i). Upon completion in 1993, the Century Freeway will extend 17.2 miles
through portions of southern Los Angeles County. Id.
6. Amended Consent Decree, supra note 4.
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ganizational theory, for the use of the decree. Public officials, public
interest law groups, and commentators continue to advocate employ-
ment of the consent decree in resolution of challenging problems that
derive from multi-organizational disputes. Their evaluation of the de-
cree, among other strategies, should be enhanced by additional applica-
tion of organizational theory.
II. THE CONSENT DECREE IN THEORY
A great deal of legal and public policy literature exists concerning
the consent decree. Consent decrees are used to address some of the
following public policy problems: desegregating schobl systems;7 pro-
viding more humane prison environments;' improving conditions for
the institutionalized and deinstitutionalized retarded;9 and redressing
employment discrimination. 0 Consent decrees are very common, but
the exact number is difficult to determine. Judith Resnik, a professor
of law at the University of Southern California Law Center, reports
that in 1985, approximately five percent of the dispositions filed in fed-
eral court were consent judgments, and approximately one-half were
dismissals, including several dismissed upon the consent of the par-
ties." An overwhelming majority of civil environmental enforcement
cases are settled by consent decree. 2 Indeed, the government uses the
7. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (school
board and federal government entered consent decree with intent to expedite desegrega-
tion of city schools, and precluded civil rights organization from intervening as party
plaintiff).
8. See, eg., Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D. 143 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (despite objection from
prison inmates, court accepted a proposed consent order regarding conditions of con-
finement as satisfactory to meet constitutional obligations).
9. See, eg., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d
956 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983) (finding that trial court erred in not
modifying consent decree in light of evidence that the proposed solution was
inadequate).
10. See, e.g., Local 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 506-12 (1986) (utilizing consent decree to remedy race-based discrimination in
the hiring, assigning and promoting of firefighters in violation of Title III).
11. Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 43. A notice of dismis-
sal is filed following mutual agreement to terminate a suit. These dismissals fall into
one of two categories: (1) a withdrawal without obtaining relief, or (2) a dismissal re-
sulting from an agreement (a consent decree) negotiated by the two parties.
12. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part
I/, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10063, 10080 (1984). From 1985 to 1990 the Environmental
Protection Agency experienced a three-fold increase in the number of consent decrees
1993]
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consent decree mechanism to resolve a wide variety of disputes. 13
Most simply, a consent decree is an agreement formalized by the
judiciary to settle a lawsuit according to principles agreed to by the
parties. The consent decree is a hybrid containing both contract and
judicial elements. 4 A consent judgment is a "contract" when it repre-
sents an agreement of the parties in the settlement of litigation. Com-
mentators differ regarding whether its source of authority comes from
the implementing statute 5 or from the parties' agreement. 16 The con-
sent decree also embodies a judicial (injunctive) act because the settle-
ment is subject to judicial approval and enforcement.' 7
Courts and legal scholars differ on the exact definition of consent
decree. One federal circuit, for example, distinguished between a "true
consent judgment" and a "settlement judgment."' 8 In the former, the
parties must approve of the relief provided by the judgment. In the
latter, the parties agree on components of a judgment, but the judge
subject to monitoring. See EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, FY1990 ENFORCEMENT
ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT 3-1 (EPA Pub. 21E-2002, 1991).
13. See Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements,
and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. Ca. LEGAL F. 327, 335. Amend-
ments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1988), reflect the government's approval of the use
of consent decrees as a solution to many conflicts. The implications of such amend-
ments are explored in Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental
Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 157, 169-72 (1989).
14. Some argue that the hybrid model fails to explain the functioning of consent
decrees or the means to evaluate these decrees. See Thomas M. Mengler, Consent De-
cree Paradigms: Models without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REv. 291, 292 (1988) (arguing
that the hybrid model fails to provide a clear understanding of a court's proper role in
evaluating consent decrees); Julie K. Rademaker, Note, Alliance to End Repression v.
City of Chicago: Judicial Abandonment of Consent Decree Principles, 80 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1675 (1986) (noting that the hybrid model leads to an ambiguous judicial response
to consent decrees).
15. Percival, supra note 13, at 334.
16. Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U.
CHL LEGAL F. 19, 20.
17. See Mengler, supra note 14, at 292; Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Con-
sent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725, 726. A consent
decree might implicate either equitable or legal powers. Professor Resnik wrote:
[T]hose litigants who have terminated their lawsuit by a consent decree have a
contract that is something more (how much more is not clear) than a "private
contract." A judge has signed the contract, and that contract can be enforced as a
continuation of the original lawsuit and, in other jurisdictions, as a judgment.
Resnick, supra note 11, at 47.
18. Resnick, supra note 11, at 45 n.4.
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determines the detailed terms of the relief and the form of the decree. 9
Consent decrees may contain formal devices to monitor compliance.
They vary in effectiveness and in intrusiveness into the defendant's ac-
tions. The monitoring devices range from the court's retention ofjuris-
diction to the full time appointment of a special master to oversee
decree implementation.2" These "structural injunctions" may require
the defendants, often governmental bodies, to reorganize themselves in
order to comply with the standard the judicial decree specifies.21 Pro-
fessor Horowitz, a professor of law at Duke University School of Law,
points out that these structural reform decrees provide extensive, af-
firmative requirements. They also assume an administrative character,
using the courts as the "manager" of a public agency.22 In addition,
structural reform decrees are legislative in nature because they require
a fundamental alteration of policy and an augmentation of financial
resources. 23 Moreover, they necessitate continuing judicial involve-
ment in their implementation and modification. 4 Finally, they are
often resistant to appellate review.25 In short, the decrees involve
courts in ongoing attempts to direct organizational behavior.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Defining what is an advantage and what is a disadvantage of the use
of the consent decree depends on one's perspective as a plaintiff or a
defendant. Because the agreement between the parties requires final
approval by the court, it is entered as a judgment in many cases. The
doctrine of res judicata precludes further litigation of the claims ad-
dressed in the settlement. The consent decree is presumed valid and is
rarely overturned. This rigidity disadvantages an agency official who
inherits the requirements of a decree without an opportunity to negoti-
ate its provisions. In contrast, this rigidity may benefit a plaintiff con-
19. Id.
20. Vincent M. Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10
U. TOL. L. REv. 419, 420-21 (1979). Special masters occupy various rules throughout
the formulation of the decree. Id. at 421.
21. Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 DuKE L. J. 1265, 1267.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1268.
25. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1268.
1993]
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cerned that the administrative agency's commitment to the consent
decree goals will diminish as agency personnel change over time.
The generally recognized advantages of settlement through consent
decrees, as opposed to litigation, include avoiding the time, expense,
and risk of a trial.26 The decree may provide for a detailed, far-ranging
injunction2 7 and increases the likelihood of obtaining a better agree-
ment. Moreover, because the interested parties composed the decree, it
should be easier to implement than a judge-formulated decree.2 8 Ulti-
mately, defendants are more likely to comply with a decree that they
helped formulate.29
The use of consent decrees also provides important advantages to
defendant agencies. Agencies are able to implement their preferred re-
medial plan without fear of judicial interference. The decrees also pro-
tect them from a potential adverse judgment on the merits based on a
broad question of law, which the court may be in-equipped to
resolve.3o
There are also several legal disadvantages associated with the use of
the consent decree. Consent decrees circumvent the separation of pow-
ers by appropriating public power for private purposes. Moreover,
"trial and judgment" serve public purposes and should not be disposed
of through the settlement process.31 Consent decrees may also restrict
the true and beneficial adversarial relationship between settling par-
26. Anderson, supra note 17, at 726. See also Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law
by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institu-
tional Reform, 1984 DuKE L. J. 887, 898 (concluding that consent decrees provide the
ideal solution to complex Title VII cases). Occasionally, empirical evidence contradicts
the advantages of consent decrees. See Marina T. Lawson, Note, Consent Decrees and
the EPA: Are They Really Enforceable Against the Agency?, 1 PACE ENVTL. L. REv.
147 (1983) (noting the difficulty of imposing consent decrees upon administrative
agencies).
27. Anderson, supra note 17, at 726.
28. Id. at 727. See also Theodore J. Stein, Issues in the Development, Implementa-
tion, and Monitoring of Consent Decrees and Court Orders, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 141, 153-54 (1987) (discussing the implementation of consent decrees and court
orders).
29. Anderson, supra note 17, at 727. See also Kathleen S. Schoene, Voluntarily
Unlocking the Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class Action Consent Decrees in School
Desegregation, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1305, 1309 (1982) (finding that the cooperation inher-
ent in a voluntary settlement ensures the long-range success of a consent judgment pro-
moting desegregation).
30. Percival, supra note 13, at 331.
31. Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 15. See also
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ties," especially in controversies between administrative agencies.33
Additionally, consent decrees adversely affect third-party interests
without affording those parties any representation.34 Unlike public
court hearings, settlement negotiations often occur in secret, preclud-
ing public scrutiny.35 Consequently, the party controlling the settle-
ment negotiations dominates the bargaining process,36 thus delegating
public policymaking authority to private interests.37 These potentially
unrepresentative decrees bind successors in office, despite their lack of
adequate representation in the negotiation process and their failure to
assent to the provisions of the decree.38 As a practical matter, these
decrees are often forced upon an agency without consideration of the
agency's ability to fund its compliance with the decree provisions.39
Resnick, supra note 11, at 55 (quoting Systems Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651
(1961)).
Nevertheless, case law supports the "party-control" concept of consent judgments.
For example, according to Judge Resnick, judges who interpret decrees should focus on
the parties' agreement. Id. at 54 (citing U.S. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S.
223, 237-38 (1975)). Judges should decline to explore the purpose behind the "legisla-
tion that gave rise to the underlying action." Id. It is inappropriate for a judge to force
a provision of a settlement agreement upon the parties, absent their assent. Id. at 55.
32. Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree: An Analysis of
Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 272.
33. See id. at 270-76. Procedural barriers govern a consent decree's potential to
limit judicial discretion, as well as the decree's potential adverse effect on third-party
interests. Id.
34. Id. See also Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87
MICH. L. REV. 321 (1988) (discussing both the beneficial and adverse effects of consent
decrees, plus third party rights in consent decrees); Randolph D. Moss, Participation
and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811
(1986) (discussing the third party interest in school desegregation consent decrees); Su-
zanne Burris, Note, EEOC Consent Decrees: Nonbinding on Unsatisfied Private Parties
under Title VII, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 629, 644 (1985) (discussing the non-binding
effects of an EEOC consent decree on non-interviewing parties); Schwarzschild, supra
note 26, at 909-10 (noting that consent decrees do not always satisfy every member of a
minority class).
35. Shane, supra note 32, at 271.
36. Fiss, supra note 31, at 11.
37. Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neil E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government,
40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 274 (1987).
38. Fiss, supra note 31, at 7.
39. Cf. Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91
HARv. L. REv. 428, 453-55 (1977) (citing court orders compelling state officials to
spend unappropriated surplus money to implement remedial decrees). The implementa-
tion of consent decrees intrudes on agency autonomy. Timothy S. Jost, The Attorney
1993]
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Although federal courts lack the authority to direct the expenditure of
agency funds, a consent decree can require federal courts to order
agencies to implement reforms, close facilities, or otherwise alter
services. 4°
As a procedural matter, the enforcement, interpretation, and modifi-
cation of consent decrees all present separation of powers issues.41 The
separation of powers doctrine reflects the constitutional assignment of
differing responsibilities and authorities among the three branches of
government. The doctrine assigns Congress the responsibility for mak-
ing laws; the executive the responsibility of implementing laws; and the
courts the responsibility for interpreting the laws.42 Arguably, the con-
sent decree violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing the
judiciary to act in an executive or legislative capacity.43
The judiciary is criticized often for supporting settlement by consent
decree. Critics allege that the federal judiciary encourages settlement
General's Policy on Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 39 ADMIN. L. Rav.
101, 102 (1987). A concern for agency autonomy may explain former Attorney General
Meese's reluctance to tender consent decrees or settlement agreements. The former
Attorney General's dislike of consent decrees reflected a desire not to constrain the
discretion of executive branch agencies and departments. His policy forbade decrees
that (1) mandated revision or promulgation of regulations; (2) required expenditures of
unappropriated funds; or (3) divested an agency of its discretion to make policy choices
or protect third party rights. See id. (discussing former Attorney General Meese's
policy).
40. Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, supra note 39, at
453-55.
41. Shane, supra note 32, at 268.
42. Id. at 278. See also Rabkin & Devins, supra note 37, at 219 (comparing the
authority of the executive branch to enter a consent decree and the options available to
private litigants); Lawson, supra note 26, at 148 (addressing the separation of powers
issues presented in EPA consent decrees); J. Robert Robertson, Note, The Effects of
Consent Decrees on Local Legislative Immunity, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1121, 1137 (1989)
(analyzing the problem of integrating executive and legislative powers within one body).
Federalism is a separate but related constitutional criticism of consent decrees. See
Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State Governmental
Entities, 88 COLUM. L. Rav. 1796, 1804 (1988) (detailing federalism concerns as a
source of flaws in consent decrees).
43. Justice Department guidelines in force during the Reagan Administration
stated: "[i]t is constitutionally impermissible for the courts to enter consent decrees
containing... provisions where the courts would not have had the power to order such
relief had the matter been litigated." Memorandum from the Attorney General to the
Justice Department, (March 13, 1986) (on file with author). The Supreme Court re-
jected this premise in Local Number 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, AFL-CIO, 478 U.S. 501, 522-24 (1986).
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decrees to avoid litigation.' Other critics cite the court's inexperience
in detailing remedies, costs, and benefits in consent decrees.45 The
court is removed from the daily operations of administrative agencies;
thus it is difficult for the judicial branch to identify the administrative
issues relevant to a meaningful remedy. Critics accuse courts of ignor-
ing the widely acknowledged patterns of administrative agency behav-
ior which are relevant to the formulation of a successful decree.46
III. THE CENTURY FREEWAY CASE, SETTLEMENT, AND THE
DECREE PROVISIONS
A. Description of Original Complaint and Injunction
In February 1972 a recently-formed public interest law firm, the
Center for Law in the Public Interest, filed a federal class action
against both federal and state transportation agencies. The plaintiffs
included several residents of the area located within the proposed Cen-
tury Freeway right-of-way, the NAACP, the Sierra Club, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, and the "Freeway Fighters."'47 Two months
later, the City of Hawthorne joined as a plaintiff. The suit sought to
block state acquisition of property for the Century Freeway project
pending the approval of environmental impact statements (EIS).48 The
44. Resnik, supra note 11, at 97. Resnick questions whether "a judge who helps
shape a proposed consent decree can fairly adjudicate either the adequacy of the repre-
sentation or the adequacy of the compromise itself ... ." Id. See also Implementation
Problems of Institutional Reform Litigation, supra note 39, at 435-37 (discussing judicial
deficiencies in implementing institutional reform).
45. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1288-1302 (analyzing the issues involved in institu-
tional reform).
46. See Anderson, supra note 17, at 725-78 (discussing the history of the consent
decree and offering suggestions of implementation reform); Stein, supra note 28, at 141-
59 (discussing how judicial remedies are currently devised, implemented, and monitored
and suggesting new approaches for judicial remedies); Note, Judicial Intervention and
Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513
(1980) (discussing the competence of court intervention in policy and administration);
for a more general treatment of implementation issues, see generally MALCOLM L.
GROGGIN, ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION THEORY AND PRACTICE: TOWARD A THIRD
GENERATION (1990); DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & PAUL SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983).
47. Kathleen Armstrong, Note, Litigating the Freeway Revolt: Keith v. Volpe, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 761, 761 n.2 (1972).
48. For text of the governing state and federal environmental laws, see National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1970); see also California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §§ 21000-21165 (West Supp. 1972).
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suit also alleged inadequate relocation assistance;49 denial of equal pro-
tection of the minorities and poor residents of the corridor; inadequate
public hearings on the proposed project;5" and violation of due
process.51
In July 1972 the district court enjoined the Century Freeway.5 2 The
injunction, issued by Judge Harry Pregerson, called for: (1) prepara-
tion of a formal environmental impact statement; (2) additional public
hearings on the noise and air pollution concerns; (3) additional studies
on the availability of replacement housing for those displaced by the
project; and (4) specific state assurances relating to relocation assist-
ance.5 3 The court of appeals upheld the decision.54 Work on the Cen-
tury Freeway did not resume for seven years following this
injunction.5
The state completed its environmental analysis of the project in Sep-
tember 1977 and submitted its environmental impact statement to the
federal government. 6 The impact statement proposed a reduction in
the project from the ten lanes originally planned to only eight lanes and
a transitway.57 The proposal also routed the western portion of the
freeway away from the central business district of the City of
Hawthorne.58
In March 1978 President Carter unveiled his National Urban Policy,
which included transportation programs as part of a larger effort to
49. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970 [hereinafter Relocation Act], 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1970).
50. Federal Highways Act [hereinafter Highway Act], 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-512 (1968)
(repealed 1971).
51. Armstrong, supra note 47, at 761 n.7.
52. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1351 (C.D. Ca. 1972), affid sub noma. Keith
v. California Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975).
53. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. at 1351. For a detailed analysis of this phase of the
Century Freeway litigation, see generally Armstrong, supra note 47.
54. Keith v. California Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d at 698.
55. For background on this transitional phase of the Century Freeway public works
project, see Norman Emerson, The Century Freeway Corridor Project: The Interstate
System in Transition, paper presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Transportation
Research Board 16 (Jan. 21, 1980) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washing-
ton University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law).
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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promote urban revitalization. 9 In October 1978, pursuant to Presi-
dent Carter's urban revitalization initiative, the United States Secretary
of Transportation approved the Century Freeway Project as pro-
posed.' On that same day, the parties to the class action announced a
tentative settlement.6 '
B. Settlement
A number of factors influenced the settlement decision. A court rul-
ing of the inadequacy of the EIS could not be guaranteed. 62 The pros-
pects were questionable that a court would rule that the project
violated the consistency requirements of the Clean Air Act.63 It was
not in the plaintiffs' interest to pursue a lengthy and costly trial," espe-
cially because plaintiffs felt that litigation was an inappropriate instru-
ment for resolving this controversy. 65
Moreover, in choosing to settle, the plaintiffs wished to avoid reli-
ance on the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to
fashion an appropriate resolution to the lawsuit. Caltrans was seen as
lacking the knowledge or ability to analyze the project and address the
critical social and economic issues at stake.6 6 Frustration was causing
public support to wane.6 7 Finally, through settling, the plaintiffs could
seek the defendants' unambiguous commitment to protect the plain-
tiffs' interests. In short, plaintiffs could fashion a comprehensive settle-
ment that reconciled their varied interests.6 "
59. Emerson, supra note 55, at 9.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Memorandum to Century Freeway Team 10 (July 28, 1987) (on file with the
Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law). In 1978, the Center
for Law analyzed numerous Ninth Circuit decisions. The Center's analysis indicated
that the court upheld almost every case concerning the adequacy of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS).
63. Id.
64. Author A-l, Notes on History of Litigation, Center for Law (not dated) (on file
with the Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law).
65. Id. at 1.
66. Id.
67. Author A-2, Talking Paper, Center for Law 3 (not dated) (on file with the
Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law).
68. Id.
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C. The Century Freeway Consent Decree
Following the execution of the decree, preliminary work com-
menced.69 Early in 1981, however, federal budgetary constraints and
Reagan administration opposition to the decree imperiled progress on
the Century Freeway.70 In March 1981 the federal government de-
clared that it would not finance replacement housing until the state
provided guarantees that it could acquire sufficient financing for the
entire freeway project.7 In May 1981 the federal government an-
nounced that it was undertaking a cost-effectiveness study of the entire
Century Freeway project.72 A series of meetings among federal, state,
and local officials resulted in amendments to the consent decree, reduc-
ing the project's size.73
The amended final consent decree, signed on September 22, 1981,
advanced five purposes: (1) to permit the 1-105 freeway to be built
according to the specifications provided in the decree; (2) to provide for
a bus or rail transitway within the corridor; (3) to preserve the quantity
of housing available in the area affected by the project; (4) to ensure
that the affected communities benefit from the enhanced employment
opportunities generated by the project; and (5) to avoid further litiga-
tion.74 The consent decree dissolved the preliminary injunction that
blocked the project.75 The district court retained jurisdiction over the
consent decree until the dismissal of the action.76
Although the transportation aspects of this consent decree7 7 raise
important public policy issues, the "social engineering" aspects of con-
69. Notes on History of Litigation, supra note 64.
70. Interview with C-1.
71. Century Freeway Plan Periled, Caltrans Says, L.A. TIMES, April 1, 1981, at A3.
72. New Blow to Century Freeway Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1981, at B1.
73. Id.
74. Amended Final Consent Decree, supra note 4, at 3. The decree incorporates
four appendices. Exhibit A describes the commitments of those agencies providing
funding for the transitway. Exhibit B is the housing relocation plan. Exhibit C is the
affirmative action plan. Id. at 4. Exhibit D graphically depicts the locations of certain
transitway features. Id. at 8.
75. Amended Final Consent Decree, supra note 4, at 5.
76. Id. at 16.
77. The transportation elements included a reduction in the size of the project, in-
corporation of high occupancy vehicle lanes, accommodation of a light rail line, and a
reduction in the number of local interchanges. Amended Final Consent Decree, supra
note 4, at 5-11.
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sent decrees raise equally important constitutional concerns.7 These
are most susceptible to the vagaries of the implementation process. An
examination of those social elements and their resolution highlights the
organizational and interorganizational dynamics which confront dis-
pute resolution by consent decree.
D. The Housing Program
The plaintiffs' original complaint in the Century Freeway lawsuit
alleged that the defendant agencies failed to: provide adequate reloca-
tion payments and assistance programs; submit specific relocation as-
surances to the Federal Highway Administration; and insure the
sufficiency of suitable replacement housing prior to acquiring the right-
of-way.79
At the time of the lawsuit, FHWA policy required that relocation
assistance include: (1) "personal contact" with all those to be dis-
placed; (2) delivery of a brochure which explained the general terms of
relocation; and (3) an explanation of the availability of relocation serv-
ices and payments.8 0 The FHWA regulations prohibit the California
Division of Highways to displace any homeowner without a ninety-day
written notice of their displacement and a list of three comparable and
available replacement homes.8" The State, however, is not required to
provide any special assistance for those with special needs.8 2
The courts bore responsibility for monitoring compliance with these
state agency regulations. In Keith v. Volpe, the court concluded that
the Division of Highways adhered to the regulations and that any fail-
ures were isolated and de minimis.13 The court did not address specifi-
78. For an analysis of the decree's constitutional implications, see Anthony N. R.
Zamora, Note, The Century Freeway Consent Decree, 62 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1805, 1835-42
(1989).
79. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. at 1329. Chapter V of the Highway Act prohibits
the FHWA from providing federal funds to a highway construction project that dis-
places persons living in the project's path unless these "satisfactory assurances" have
been met. Id. at 1341. The Relocation Act replaced Chapter V of the Highway Act.
Id.
80. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. at 1343-45 (citing FHWA Instructional Memoran-
dum 80-1-68 6d(3) (Sept. 5, 1968) and FHWA Instructional Memorandum 80-1-71,
12a (April 30, 1971)); 23 C.F.R. Part 1, app. A.
81. 352 F. Supp. at 1345.
82. Id. Nevertheless, the Division of ighways attempted to analyze the impact of
the Century Freeway project on the lives of the elderly and minority groups displaced
by the project. Id. at 1346.
83. Id.
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cally the sufficiency of the existing regulations. Nevertheless, the court
enjoined right-of-way acquisition for the project until the state pro-
vided project assurances on the availability of replacement housing and
the adequacy of the state's relocation program. 4
Ordinarily, absent a showing that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on
the merits, injunctive relief in an equity action is inappropriate.85
However, the court reasoned that this case was unique. Unless the
plaintiff received immediate relief, for example a preliminary injunc-
tion, the value of this relief would be worthless.8 6 In summary, the
court sought to determine at the outset the adequacy of the housing
program.87 The court ordered a state analysis of the supply of housing
in light of increased relocation payments and increased replacement
84. Id. at 1350. The court's holding is consistent with the requirements of the 1971
Amendment to the Relocation Act. This provision extends the three basic requirements
of Chapter V of the Highway Act, see supra note 79, providing that a state highway
department may not financially support any phase of a construction project causing the
displacement of any persons until it has "satisfactory assurances" that:
(1) relocation payments are provided;
(2) the state provides a written statement specifying when housing accommoda-
tions are available;
(3) the public is adequately informed of all available relocation payments and
services;
(4) the state provides a person ninety days written notice before requiring him to
move from his home, farm or business location;
(5) the state assures that its program is realistic and effectively relocates individ-
uals and families to decent, safe and sanitary housing.
Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. at 1343. The Relocation Act requires the state to make
these assurances to a specific project. Id. General statewide assurances are not accepta-
ble. Id. Although the California Division of Highways argued that it had satisfied
these assurances, the court found that the guarantees made by the Division were "gen-
eral statewide assurances," and did not single out the Century Freeway Project. Id. at
1344.
85. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. at 1349.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court stated:
No one can be completely sure, on the basis of the studies heretofore conducted,
that the available replacement housing is adequate .... The time to determine
whether the shortcomings in the housing availability studies are significant is
now.... The shortcomings and uncertainties left by the existing housing availabil-
ity studies should be resolved.
Id.
The court found that the state's studies failed to consider: (1) that people other than
those displaced by the Century Freeway will seek housing in the relevant housing mar-
kets; (2) that the construction of the freeway necessitates the demolition of housing; and
(3) the need for additional data regarding current housing availability and the quality of
that housing. Id.
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housing construction and renovation.88
Caltrans acknowledged the necessity of a provision in the decree for
housing replenishment or replacement or both.8 9 The plaintiffs con-
cerned themselves with the designation of a "lead agency" for the
housing program and the determination of the number of new units
ultimately to be built.' They preferred that the state's Department of
Housing and Community Development (HCD), not Caltrans, oversee
the program.9 The plaintiffs relied on the fact that HCD was an in-
dependent and autonomous organization, as well as an expert in the
housing field.92 The parties did not decide the number of units to be
relocated and rehabilitated at that time.93
E. Consent Decree Housing Provisions
94
In October 1979, under the terms of the consent decree, HCD as-
88. Id.
89. Memorandum from Richard G. Rypinkski to the Los Angeles Department of
Transportation Legal Division I (Feb. 15, 1979) (on file with the Washington University
Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id. Further, the plaintiffs did not want Caltrans to control the housing program
because Caltrans was a party to the suit. Id.
93. Memorandum, supra note 89, at 5-6. In 1979, Caltrans released a Community
Housing Needs Study that focused on the loss of affordable housing and its impact on
the community. See State of California Department of Transportation, Norwalk to El
Segundo Freeway-Transitway Community Housing Needs Study 1 (1979) [hereinafter
El Segundo Freeway]. The study confirmed the need for affordable housing, reflecting
the significant impact of the 1-105 transportation project on the housing supply. Id. at
2. The study noted that, in 1970, the demand for additional units exceeded 3,600. Id.
Seven years later, this figure would increase to 49,500. Id. This surge resulted from
general inflation, insufficient local construction of affordable units, increasing regional
population, and the acquisition and displacement of other public projects. Id.
By 1977, approximately 6,000 affordable housing units were acquired for the 1-105
project. The authors of this study claimed that this project significantly aggravated an
already serious housing shortage. Id. at 37. Lynwood, which lost seven percent of its
affordable housing stock, and Paramount, which lost three percent, sustained the great-
est loss of housing. Id. at 6-7. The study recommended three mitigation measures
aimed at replenishing the supply of low and moderate income housing and lessening the
freeway's impact on the housing supply: (I) attempt to relocate or rehabilitate the max-
imum number of housing units presently located within the right of way for 1-105 pro-
ject; (2) renovate the existing housing units located outside of the project's right of way;
and (3) construct new housing units. Id. at 37. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33334.5 (West 1979) (mitigating harm to owners of low and moderate income
housing by restricting rehabilitation plans).
94. This section of the text is derived primarily from the author's report for
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sumed responsibility for the construction of 4,200 housing units. 9 5 The
requirement of new units addressed the housing replacement needs of
households yet to be displaced, and it replenished the reduced supply
of available housing. The consent decree established a series of zones,
each six miles further away from the project than the prior zone.9 6
Each zone was assigned a relative priority in the overall scheme of con-
structing the 4,200 units of housing. The consent decree also estab-
lished eligibility requirements and affordability guidelines for the
displaced homeowners seeking replacement housing.97 In September
1981, budgetary restrictions initiated by the United States Department
of Transportation led to an amendment of the consent decree9" and
reduced the housing production goal to 3,700 units.99
As amended, the housing portion of the project consists of three ma-
jor elements. The first, known as the "1025 Element," required the
state, acting through HCD, to rehabilitate or construct 1,025 housing
units pursuant to prior FHWA approval." The second element,
known as the "1175 Element," required the state to rehabilitate or con-
struct at least 1,175 units for corridor residents eligible for benefits
under the Relocation Act. 10 These units comprised the "last resort
housing" for eligible residents within the 1-105 right-of-way, who re-
mained without housing. The third element is the "110 Element." It
required federal defendants to authorize $110 million for state con-
struction of the maximum number of housing units obtainable with
these funds."02 The combination of these three elements was expected
to produce 3,700 housing units. The decree permits an increase in the
federal funds in response to higher construction cost for new one-fam-
ily homes. 103
The decree established a "Staging Plan" to allow freeway construc-
Caltrans. See Final Report, supra note 2, at H1-31, 11-32 (on file with the Washington
University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law).
95. Id. at 11-13.
96. Final Consent Decree, app. B, supra note 4, at 11.
97. Id. at 2-6.
98. Amended Final Consent Decree, supra note 4.
99. Final Report, supra note 2, at H1-13, H1-14. The cost of the housing program
was about half of the cost estimated in the 1979 decree.
100. See Amended Final Consent Decree, app. B, supra note 2, at 4.
101. Id.
102. See Amended Final Consent Decree, app. B, supra note 4, at 2.
103. Subsequently, the $110 million program was adjusted to $126 million. Final
Report, supra note 2, at H-43, n.3.
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tion while ensuring the availability of all decree-mandated housing."
The staging plan permitted freeway construction to proceed prior to
the relocation or replacement of housing. The decree further estab-
lished a "Review Plan," to allow for modification of the timing and
scope of the housing program.1"5 In deciding whether to modify the
Staging Plan, the court was to consider whether the housing program
caused undue delay in construction of the freeway, whether the corri-
dor communities could absorb the housing, and whether the housing
program was effective.
Under the project, a percentage of housing units was to become
available for occupancy as the state awarded a given percentage of the
freeway construction contracts. The decree did allow the state to
award the first half of the freeway contracts prior to the construction of
any replacement or replenishment housing. Prior to awarding the sec-
ond twenty-five percent of the freeway contracts, the decree required
that the state make available at least thirty percent of the housing units
required under the decree. 1o6
F. Structure for Planning and Implementation 'o7
HCD served as the lead agency responsible for the coordination and
implementation of the housing program."1s The Project Director for
the 1-105 project assumed responsibility for the following: (1) acquir-
ing sites for replacement housing; (2) preparing a formal Housing Plan;
(3) soliciting bids; (4) selecting subcontractors; and (5) awarding con-
tracts."°9 The Director was to locate as many replacement units as
possible within the six mile primary zone on either side of the freeway
right-of-way. Absent space in the primary zone, the Director utilized
more distant secondary or tertiary zones. "0
The decree also established a Housing Advisory Committee (HAC)
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. In 1987, Caltran's progress on the freeway exceeded HCD's housing pro-
duction. Ultimately, Judge Pregerson eliminated the freeway and housing phasing re-
quirement because it became apparent that progress on the freeway far exceeded HCD's
construction pace. Final Report, supra note 2, at 11-32.
107. This section of the text is derived primarily from the author's report for
Caltrans. See Final Report, supra note 2, at 11-32.
108. Amended Final Consent Decree, app. B, supra note 2, at 9.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. at 11.
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to assist and consult with the Project Director."'l Sixty members com-
prised the HAC. No more than thirty-three were representatives of
official agencies; the plaintiffs and HCD jointly selected the other
twenty-seven.11 The HAC was responsible for conducting public
hearings on the Housing Plan and ultimately approving the Plan.113
Federal and state defendants assumed responsibility for the funding,
development, and implementation of the Housing Plan. Caltrans re-
ceived reimbursements for all project costs; all ineligible costs, includ-
ing housing project administration costs and overhead were to be
assumed by Caltrans. FHWA approved all final budgets. HCD had
authority to interact directly with federal defendants in any activity
related to the implementation of the housing program. 114
G. The Affirmative Action Issue
The affirmative action component of the Century Freeway was not a
response to a claim against Caltrans for discriminatory employment
practices or discriminatory practices in awarding contracts.11 5 Judge
Pregerson noted this in his order denying the Associated General Con-
tractor's motion to intervene.116 Moreover, the plaintiffs' original com-
plaint did not allege any race or sex discrimination with respect to
111. Id.
112. Id. at 11-12.
113. Amended Final Consent Decree, app. B, supra note 2, at 12, 14.
114. Id. at 18-19.
115. Since the early 1970s, consent decrees have been used to settle numerous race
and sex discrimination suits. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-1. Title VII was the
basis of the majority of these suits. Title VII is the section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that addresses discrimination in employment. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78
Stat. 241, 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1, 2000e-17 (1982)).
The "Title VII consent decree" remedies alleged discriminatory employment practices,
usually relating to hiring, promotions, or lay-offs. In addition to the Title VII affirma-
tive action consent decree, parties employ affirmative action consent decrees to settle
equal protection suits. Although they are based on the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, these suits often encompass
allegations of employment discrimination. Equal protection consent decrees differ from
Title VII consent decrees because they intend to settle discrimination suits against gov-
ernmental entities. Police departments, fire departments, and public school districts are
often defendants in suits settled by equal protection consent decrees. Final Report,
supra note 2, at VI-1.
116. The judge wrote that "[n]o allegations of employment discrimination were
made in the original complaint." Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Inter-
vene, Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Ca.) (No. 72-355-HP) (1972) [hereinafter
Motion to Intervene].
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hiring or contracting practices. Absent these allegations, the claim or-
dinarily would be insufficient to induce a court to authorize an affirma-
tive action program. In this respect the Century Freeway decree is
unique.' 7
H. Consent Decree Affirmative Action Provisions
Three parts comprised the affirmative action plan mandated by Ap-
pendix C of the consent decree: The first part established "employ-
ment goals" by requiring contractors to hire female and minority
employees;I" the second part required contractors to utilize "minority
and women-owned business enterprises (MBEs and WBEs)";" 9 and
the final part established "regional business preferences" by requiring
the employment of individuals engaged in business in the corridor
area.'20 Although the plan provided a monitoring mechanism, it failed
to elaborate on the implementation of these programs.
A summary of federal affirmative action requirements puts into per-
spective the affirmative action goals of the Century decree. Roughly
seventy-five percent of Caltrans' projects receive federal funding.
Therefore, Caltrans must comply with the Department of Labor em-
ployment discrimination guidelines.' 2 ' These federal guidelines do not
establish fixed, numerical employment goals for the entire nation.
Rather, Labor Department standards require that the proportion of
minority labor employed in a federally funded project be equivalent to
the percentage of experienced minority laborers in the Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Area (SMSA) where the project is to be located.' 2 2
117. It is difficult to identify the nexus between the plaintiffs' original complaint and
the affirmative action provisions of the consent decree. However, during the consent
decree negotiations of 1979 and 1981, Caltrans was involved in a minority contracting
dispute regarding the Grove-Shafter Freeway in Oakland. In April 1979 the Secretary
of Business and Transportation, Alan Stein, suspended construction of that freeway
because of complaints concerning the minimal participation of minority subcontractors.
See Minority Complaints Halt Work on Oakland Freeway, S. F. CHRON., April 24,
1979, at A5. This controversy fails to establish an agency-wide pattern of slow response
to affirmative action mandates. Nevertheless, it reflects a heightened sensitivity to the
freeway's costs to minority communities. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-5.
118. Amended Final Consent Decree, app. C, supra note 4, at 18-22.
119. Id. at 5-17.
120. Id. at 22-23.
121. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-6. See Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 41 C.F.R.
§ 60 (1978) (delineating the Standard Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Con-
struction Contract Specifications).
122. HAMILTON, RABINOVITZ AND ALSCHULER, INC., Meeting the Employment
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The decree's employment provisions satisfied the Labor Department
standards, while achieving the decree's affirmative action objectives. 123
Prior to 1987, federal law required states to spend ten percent of
FHWA funds on Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) and two
percent of FHWA funds on WBEs. In 1987 Congress amended this
provision. Now Congress requires states to spend at least ten percent
of their FHWA funds on all DBEs, including WBEs. 24
1. Equal Opportunity Employment Goals
The consent decree establishes specific hiring goals for each trade
employed in the construction projects covered by the decree. After
1981, the decree required these goals to reflect specific demographic
data on the corridor. Under the decree, Caltrans established appren-
ticeship and training programs with specific enrollment standards.1
25
Goals of the Century Freeway Consent Decree 7 (1988) (unpublished report, on file
with author).
123. The report stated that:
.. what distinguishes the Century Freeway employment goals that were agreed to
in the Consent Decree was not their prohibition of discrimination, nor their re-
quirement of affirmative action, nor their setting of numerical goals. Rather, the
distinguishing features were:
(1) The establishment of specific levels of employment attainment that were
geared to the demography of the Century Freeway Corridor and were apparently
intended to be met from residents of the Corridor;
(2) The special efforts specifically required of Caltrans to inform contractors of
these goals; and
(3) The creation of CFAAC [the Century Freeway Affirmative Action Commit-
tee] to monitor the attainment of these goals.
Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-6 (quoting HAMILTON, RABINOVITZ, AND AL-
SCHULER, INC., Meeting the Employment Goals of the Century Freeway Consent De-
cree 11 (1988)).
124. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-6. A DBE is a business owned and con-
trolled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. A DBE
must comply with the Small Business Administration's definition of a "small business."
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-17,
101 Stat. 132 (1987). Individuals presumed to be socially and economically disadvan-
taged include African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, Asian-Pa-
cific Americans, Asian-Indian Americans, and women. No general federal standards
exist with regard to regional business preference. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-6
n.3.
125. Amended Final Consent Decree, app. C, supra note 4, at 18-21. The decree
requires the contractors on the 1-105 projects to exercise "best efforts" to meet the goals
of the decree. The contractors must document these efforts. Under the decree, a bid or
proposal will be considered non-responsive if it fails to establish an affirmative action
plan that facilitates the specified employment goals. Id.
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In addition, the decree established the Century Freeway Affirmative
Action Committee (CFAAC). Numerous organizations, possessing va-
ried interests in the Century project, comprised CFAAC. The Com-
mittee assumed responsibility for six tasks: (1) monitoring affirmative
action compliance; (2) participating in affirmative action goal setting;
(3) participating in bid conferences; (4) participating in the process of
awarding contracts; (5) monitoring contractors; and (6) increasing mi-
nority participation through recruiting efforts aimed at minority and
women owned business.1 2 6 CFAAC reported its findings to the court.
2. Minority Business Enterprise Program
The decree required Caltrans to set participation goals for minority
and women-owned businesses. Caltrans based these goals on the
number of businesses located within the corridor region that were ca-
pable of working on specific projects. 127 Caltrans, with CFAAC's
assistance, was to develop outreach and technical programs aimed at
all minority and women-owned businesses eligible to participate in the
program. 128 The decree required Caltrans to follow a specific process
in awarding contracts.1
29
126. Id. at 26-27. Members of CFAAC included representatives from Caltrans,
FHWA, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, NAACP, NOW, the Mexican-
American Opportunity Foundation, and the Governor of California. In April 1988 four
court-appointed members joined the CFAAC Board. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-
7.
127. Id. at 6. See also 49 C.F.R. § 23.45(g) (1991) (discussing the percentage of
work to be awarded to MBEs). The decree defines a M/WBE as a business which is at
least 51% owned by one or more minorities or women and whose management and
daily business operations are controlled by one or more such individuals. Amended
Final Consent Decree, app. C, at 5-6.
128. Id. at 7-8. To ascertain eligibility, the decree requires Caltrans to publish a list
of certified M/WBEs and to explain how a M/WBE subcontractor's work counts to-
ward contract goals. Id. at 8-9.
129. Id. at 9-15, 23-25. In general, bidders are ineligible for contract awards if they
fail to satisfy M/WBE goals and fail to demonstrate reasonable efforts to achieve those
goals. Id. at 14. Once the bid from a contractor is accepted, the decree requires the
general contractor to make good faith efforts to replace a M/WBE subcontractor that
fails to perform the job with another M/WBE subcontractor. Id. at 15. In addition,
the decree describes the duties of CFAAC and Caltrans regarding mandated pre-bid,
pre-award, and pre-constrnction conferences. Id. at 23-25. Finally, the decree, through
the Regional Business Preference Program, affords corridor businesses the opportunity
to participate in jobs created by the project. Id. at 22-23. For example, the program
requires not only that contractors subcontract to corridor businesses but also that the
general contractors patronize local eating establishments, suppliers, and caterers. Final
Report, supra note 2, at VI-8.
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Under Exhibit C of the plan, Caltrans must specify the exact number
of contracts available to minority contractors and the exact number of
jobs available to minority workers. Moreover, the amended portion of
the decree sets the project's equal opportunity goals higher than the
employment goals established under the MBE provision of the 1977
Public Works Act and its subsequent regulations. 130
I. Establishment of an Office of the Advocate for Corridor Residents
The decree also created an Office of the Advocate for Corridor Resi-
dents (Advocate). The Advocate's office was to: (1) operate a local
office; (2) monitor compliance with all applicable state and federal reg-
ulations pertaining to the relocation rights of those displaced; (3) col-
lect complaints from displaced homeowners; (4) provide relocation
benefit information; (5) assist displaced homeowners with complaints
regarding eligibility for benefits, amount of payment, or provision of
adequate replacement housing; (6) assist displaced homeowners in
resolving disputes with Caltrans; and (7) request Caltrans to correct
significant, widespread noncompliance.13 ' The decree funded the Ad-
vocate's office in the same manner as other project costs.132 The plain-
tiffs selected the Advocate, although, under some circumstances, the
court could remove the Advocate. The Secretary of Business, Trans-
portation and Housing provided the final forum for the Advocate, Cal-
trans, and the plaintiffs to appeal the funding decisions of the Director
130. Parts of Appendix C were modeled after federal legislation and regulations.
The contract set-aside provision for !MIBEs and WBEs is modeled after § 103(f)(2) of the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977. It provides that: no grant shall be made under
this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assur-
ance to the Secretary that at least ten percent of the amount of each grant shall be
expended for minority business enterprises. 42 U.S.C. § 6075(0(2) (1988). The minor-
ity and female employment provision reflects regulations developed by the federal Office
of Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of the Department of Labor. 41 C.F.R.
§ 60 (1978) (implementing the promotion criteria advanced in Executive Order 11,246
and insuring equal opportunity to government contractors). Although the equal oppor-
tunity goals of the Century Freeway decree were initially established in the absence of
any specific study, Caltrans eventually commissioned an outside consultant to oversee
the project. Sandra Turner, Employment Study: Century Freeway Transitway 73-84
(June 1984) (unpublished manuscript, on fie with the Washington University Journal of
Urban and Contemporary Law). The consultant's report recommended the adoption of
more ambitious goals for minority and female employment. Id. at 75. These goals for
employment usually increased over time, while subcontracting goals were established on
a project by project basis. Final Report, supra note 2, at VI-9.
131. Amended Final Consent Decree, supra note 4, at 11.
132. Id. at 11-12.
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of Housing and Community Development. 133
IV. PROCESS, STRUCTURE, AND CONTENT: ORGANIZATION
THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSENT
DECREE
The literature on consent decrees as an alternative to litigation sug-
gests a number of critical "ingredients" in any successful consent de-
cree.1 34 Several propositions are derived from this literature. These
propositions suggest that a successful consent decree considers the
unique character of the agencies it will affect. The propositions are
evaluated from the perspective of the hundreds of participants involved
in the implementation of the Century Freeway consent decree. 135
A. Recognizing and Surmounting Bureaucratic
Limitations and Rivalries
Courts often assume that the most significant obstacle to implement-
ing a consent decree is the formulation process. Unfortunately, organi-
zation theory and experience counter this assumption. Many forces
and interests, some not necessarily represented in litigation, become
relevant. The decree's implementation depends on organizations
whose behavior often lies beyond the reach of the court issuing the
decree. Even if the parties comply with the decree, there is no guaran-
tee that its goals will be met.
The Century Freeway consent decree required the creation of a com-
plex, interorganizational network, comprised of several entities. Ulti-
mately, six key participants formulated the decree: Caltrans, Century
133. Id. at 11-14.
134. See supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the general
advantages and disadvantages of the consent decree. A successful decree is generally
defined as an agreement that is fairly formulated and efficiently implemented.
135. This section of the Article summarizes the evaluations of these propositions
made by 125 attorneys, administrators, monitors, engineers, and other implementors of
the decree. All unattributed quotations presented in this and subsequent sections of the
article are drawn from confidential interviews with these individuals. See Final Report,
supra note 2, at IV-26 to IV-36. We asked interviewees to assess the accuracy of each
proposition in light of their knowledge of the Century Freeway decree's implementa-
tion. The majority of respondents perceived each of the following seven propositions as
important in explaining implementation of the Century Freeway decree. Id. at IV-25.
Our interviews also revealed a general weakness of the consent decree: it fails to recog-
nize the existing characteristics of organizational relations, and attempts to impose new,
ambiguously defined organizational roles on the agencies involved.
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Freeway Affirmative Action Committee (CFAAC), the Office of the
Advocate, the Center for Law, the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), and Housing and Community Development (HCD).136
Although Caltrans worked with FHWA previously, it was unfamiliar
with the other four groups. The HCD existed prior to the formulation
of the consent decree, yet in order to fulfill its mandate under the de-
cree, HCD created new roles for its members. The Office of the Advo-
cate and CFAAC arose in response to the social impacts of the
Century Freeway Project. The Center for Law in the Public Interest
was a fledgling group prior to the decree. Given the mutual unfamili-
arity among these six entities, it became necessary to develop new re-
porting, coordination, and oversight procedures.
Caltrans alleges that the decree disrupted the decision-making pro-
cess by introducing six different parties into a dispute originally involv-
ing only one class of plaintiffs and one group of defendants. Hostility
and conflict existed between Caltrans and the Center for Law, which
advocated social programs required pursuant to the decree. Conflicts
existed between Caltrans and the Advocate and CFAAC, the organiza-
tions created explicitly to provide monitoring and oversight of Cal-
trans. In addition, dissension existed between Caltrans and HCD, two
sister state agencies assigned responsibility for the highway and hous-
ing programs respectively.
Caltrans' employees expressed skepticism about the selection of
HCD as the state agency primarily responsible for the decree's housing
program. Many interviewees agreed that the decision lacked a rational
assessment of the two agencies' records in housing production. Rather,
HCD became the lead agency in the housing program as a result of an
oddly convivial relationship between the Center and HCD. Moreover,
the assignment appeared as a threat to Caltrans' autonomy over the
project's construction. These perceptions colored the relationship be-
tween HCD and Caltrans throughout the implementation of the
decree. 137
136. Final Report, supra note 2, at IV-25. In addition, Caltrans maintained rela-
tionships with the Century Freeway Technical Assistance Program and the Century
Freeway Pre-apprenticeship Training Program. Our data did not allow meaningful
analysis of these relationships; however, they are not central to understanding this re-
port. For an academic analysis of the interorganizational networks involved in this
consent decree, see Myrna Mandell, Application of a Network Analysis to the Implemen-
tation of a Complex Project, 37 HuM. REL. 659, 660 (1984).
137. The perception that Caltrans was improperly denied responsibility for the
housing program was particularly strong among Caltrans' right-of-way officials who
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Caltrans viewed HCD as a forced partner, which earned a "special
place" in the consent decree program because of its tie to Governor
Brown's administration. Caltrans personnel felt pressured to cooperate
with less competent partners because of a relationship based mainly on
fiscal and political considerations and not on any mutual respect. Nu-
merous Caltrans' respondents mentioned HCD's lack of experience
with large scale projects, personnel weaknesses, vague and unsubstanti-
ated notions of corruption, and poor understanding of administrative
policies and procedures.
By early 1987 Caltrans was to have awarded fifty percent of the free-
way construction contracts. However, after losing its bid for assign-
ment as the lead agency for the housing program, Caltrans neglected
the program. Consequently, for some time the housing program failed.
It lacked consistent leadership. Four different executive directors at-
tempted to run the Century Freeway Housing Program within a very
short time. As of May 1983 HCD determined that only thirty-two
housing units out of a required 3,700 units were constructed. A review
of the housing program found poor management, a lack of leadership,
incompetence, and widespread morale problems. 138 In addition, va-
cancies existed in more than thirty percent of the program's authorized
positions. Friction existed between CFHP and Caltrans and between
CFHP and the Federal Highway Administration. 139
In early 1983, Caltrans now under a new administration, reassessed
its role in the housing program, focusing on staffing and managerial
needs. Caltrans expressed concern that the lack of housing production
might slow progress on freeway construction. Caltrans also feared that
the project might suffer financial problems as a result of the housing
program's problems.
Caltrans realized its interest in a successful housing program, re-
gardless of which agency assumed the lead. HCD did not spend its
own money for housing construction. Rather, like all other freeway-
related projects, Caltrans and FHWA assumed all costs associated with
the housing program. The state and federal highway budgets financed
bore the responsibility for monitoring the expenditures and performance of HCD, the
agency that was assigned to administer the housing program.
138. For a substantive description of the Director of HCD's annual report, see State
of California Department of Housing and Community Development, Annual Report to
the Legislature (1985) (on fie with the Washington University Journal of Urban and
Contemporary Law).
139. Id. at 1.
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the frequent cost overruns. Subsequently, if the federal government
refused to reimburse Caltrans for housing program costs, because of
procedural or other improprieties on the part of HCD, Caltrans bore
the entire cost of the disputed item. The management review ulti-
mately concluded that "the single most significant reason the housing
program is behind schedule is [the Caltrans] Director's... instruction
to Division of Right of Way personnel to 'stay out' of the housing pro-
gram to the 'greatest extent possible.' ,4
Caltrans' posture toward HCD changed dramatically. Instead of
neglecting the housing program, Caltrans became engrossed in it.
HCD and the Center for Law interviewees felt that Caltrans was over-
zealous in its monitoring of HCD. 141 Despite the reduction in the bit-
terness and hostility between the agencies, the housing program's
progress continued to lag. In June 1989 the court restructured the
housing program, retaining HCD as the lead agency under a new dual-
track program. However, the court reallocated $60 million to a public-
private partnership program outside the aegis of HCD. Housing con-
struction remained slow, prompting the court to suggest that the par-
ties suspend the entire project pending the resolution of housing
construction and maintenance problems. 142
The imposition of FHWA regulations, tailored to road construction
projects rather than housing projects, presented another obstacle for
HCD's housing construction efforts. 143 FHWA interviewees justified
their intense scrutiny of housing program activities on the basis of the
housing program's need to produce a large number of units in a short
period of time and on FHWA's distance from actual administration of
the program.
140. Id.
141. Later in 1983, HCD's Executive Director for the Century Freeway Housing
Program wrote that the "most serious threat to consent decree implementation is the
blatant and undisguised attempt by Caltrans to assume control of the housing pro-
gram." Mendel D. Hill, Summary Director's Report: Department of Housing and
Community Development, Century Freeway Housing Program (Mar. 15, 1983) (un-
published report, on file with author). An attorney with the Center for Law described
the burden placed on HCD to satisfy "an administration that has second-guessed them
every time they went out to buy a pencil .... That's not in the best interests of the
program." Interview with PL-2.
142. Judge Harry Pregerson, Address at Status Conference (Sept. 21, 1990).
143. One HCD official said that this arrangement was partly responsible for "more
overlapping checks and balances and assignments of responsibilities than any other pro-
gram that I have been associated with.., in state government for twenty-five years."
Interview with H-I.
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Bureaucratic rivalries existed even within individual parties to the
decree. For example, interviewees both inside and outside Caltrans
criticized overlapping management controls. Caltrans' local civil
rights staff often conflicted with civil rights personnel located in the
Caltrans' Sacramento headquarters. According to interviewees, the
headquarters retained functional responsibility for the decree's civil
rights programs. However, the headquarters lacked supervisory re-
sponsibility for local managers. These problems persisted throughout
the decree's implementation. Interviewees offered several reasons for
the persistence of these organizational problems. The reasons focused
on intraorganizational or interorganizational factors: (1) the new and
unfamiliar CFAAC approach to affirmative action; (2) territorial con-
flicts among Caltrans' administrators; and (3) the lack of commitment
to civil rights issues by some senior Caltrans administrators. 144
B. Gathering and Analyzing Compliance Dates
Virtually all respondents considered mechanisms for gathering and
analyzing compliance data an essential component of any consent de-
cree. However, most thought the Century Freeway consent decree
lacked this component. Those who claimed that the decree contained
sufficient monitoring mechanisms blamed the various parties for failing
to satisfy the decree's information-gathering responsibilities.
For example, Caltrans officials and CFAAC officials blamed each
other for the failure to gather data on the employment of women, mi-
norities, and orridor residents on the various construction projects. A
consultant to the court indicated in a report that, until 1988, CFAAC
concentrated all its monitoring activity on the MBE and WBE compo-
nents of the affirmative action program. 145 Unfortunately, decree im-
plementors and overseers failed to obtain reliable data concerning the
decree's other affirmative action programs because Caltrans never de-
veloped adequate management information systems (MIS). 146
144. See, eg., Interview with Ct-2 and Ct-5.
145. CFAAC relied on the theory that "if MBE/WBE subcontractors were hired,
they in turn would hire sufficient minority and female employees to meet the employ-
ment goals. CFAAC thus set up an elaborate process to monitor MBE/WBE attain-
ment, but hoped to monitor prime and subcontractor employment compliance mainly
through statistical information from a Management Information System (MIS) pro-
vided by Caltrans." HAMILTON, RABINOVrTZ, AND ALSCHULER, INC., supra note 123,
at 14-15.
146. Perhaps a more fundamental problem is the difficulty of defining "compliance"
in the context of this decree. The decree contains few deadlines and virtually no quanti-
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Information management is a general issue relevant to the imple-
mentation of any consent decree. The sharing of data, views, concerns,
and analysis could potentially have mitigated the organizational differ-
ences that plagued the Century Freeway decree. Most Caltrans re-
spondents agreed that the decree theoretically provided for the free
exchange of information. Nonetheless, the parties never exchanged in-
formation freely.147
A small minority of Caltrans' interviewees alleged that their co-
workers purposefully obstructed the flow of information to CFAAC,
providing only information explicitly requested. Others indicated that
Caltrans withheld certain information based on confidentiality con-
cerns. Still others cited the quarterly reports and status conferences as
the only means of promoting the free exchange of information under
the decree. Finally, the remainder of respondents suggested that
problems with the exchange of information resulted less from inten-
tional obstruction than from the simple unwieldiness of the data. 148
C. The Court's Function
The court-agency relationship is a particularly important interor-
ganizational factor in consent decree implementation.1 49 Virtually all
tative standards by which to assess the extent of compliance. Some interviewees con-
cluded that compliance meant the successful negotiation of the decree's procedural
hurdles, such as holding special pre-award conferences or approving M/WBE goals for
projects. Others thought that "compliance" required only a scheduled date for a con-
tractor to begin work. A senior Caltrans administrator admitted, "[tihere are so many,
many gray areas in compliance." Interview with Ct-8.
147. One interviewee from Caltrans summarized the decree's shortcomings:
But what [the decree] doesn't provide for, and what's a shame, is an openness....
There was never a whole lot of trust .... Because we felt. .. information [would be
used] against us, our people tend to not be open and sit down and say, "Hey...
this is what we're doing, this is why we're doing it."... We just don't think we can
trust any of them. In fact, we don't trust many of our own employees for the exact
same reason, which maybe is bureaucratic paranoia. But it's a shame because the
main purpose of CFAAC especially was to get information about what we were
doing out there. Yet we turned into adversaries. So that's the sad part of that.
Interview with Ct- 11.
148. "I know that there's a perception that somehow we have a whole bunch of
information that we probably don't have. It's probably a lot of facts floating around,
but I doubt that it's collected any way that makes sense to anyone." Interview with Ct-
18.
149. Professor Anderson has noted that: "The inescapable fact is that - although
a consent decree is an agreement between the parties - it is consummated only by
judicial approval. This order is accompanied by the judge's responsibility to be involved
in the implementation of the agreement. The crucial problem is to determine what
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those interviewed concluded that an understanding of the judge was
central to understanding the implementation of the consent decree.
The consent decree judge is viewed with deep respect and even admi-
ration by all the respondents who come before him. Respondents are
virtually unanimous in their appreciation of the judge's personal com-
mitment to the consent decree. However, they indicated a strong sense
of frustration with the court's micro-management of the case and with
its approach to dispute resolution. Many Caltrans officials sensed a
judicial bias in favor of the plaintiffs; a particularly troublesome pros-
pect considering the judge's freedom in interpreting the document's
requirements. 150
The plaintiffs also experienced frustration with the judge's style in
administering the case. The plaintiffs hoped that the judge would pres-
sure Caltrans to produce the results prescribed under the decree. In-
stead, the judge exhibited extraordinary patience and tolerance
throughout the proceedings. The plaintiffs criticized the judge's desire
to compromise rather than assume a firm position. In this view, the
judge became too involved in formulating compromises, as opposed to
simply resolving disputes.' This resulted in ineffective enforcement
of the decree. The judge's desire to form a consensus among the par-
ties, rather than dictate a particular resolution diluted enforcement ef-
forts and frustrated many of the parties.
Disputes among parties to a consent decree frequently plague imple-
mentation of the decree, despite the fact that the decree appears to
settle the litigation. Lloyd Anderson, an associate professor at the Uni-
versity of Akron School of Law, identifies three stages in the judge's
role as ultimate supervisor of a decree: (1) the non-interventionist
stage, where the judge is rarely involved; (2) the mediative stage, where
should be the proper level of such involvement." Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and
Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L.
REV. 579, 586.
150. Interview with Ct-22.
151. This evaluation typifies the ideal judicial role in a consent decree proceeding:
As is the case with dispute resolution, the judge can effectively perform the enforce-
ment function if he becomes sufficiently involved, but few have chosen to devote
the large amount of time necessary for a thorough job. Rather, judges often at-
tempt to extend their efficacy by relying on committees, panels, or special masters
to aid them .... These efforts have had minimal effect because the court's dele-
gatees have had inadequate resources and power. Moreover, their power has de-
pended largely on reinforcement by the judge, which entails long delays before
orders are implemented by Defendants.
Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, supra note 39, at 459.
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the judge, perhaps using monitors or a master, helps parties resolve
differences; and (3) the adjudicative stage, where the judge simply re-
solves the issue. ' 2 The judge's selection of an appropriate posture is
key in resolving disputes. If judges assume passive roles, fostering con-
sensus rather than adjudicating an issue, they may needlessly inhibit
the implementation process.
It is difficult to categorize Judge Pregerson's dispute resolution strat-
egy using these criteria. Interviewees from the plaintiff, defendant, and
amicus parties criticize the judge's "too-consistent" approach to dis-
pute resolution. Although the judge appeared actively involved in
resolving disputes, he merely prodded the parties to reach mutually
acceptable solutions to their disputes. Parties involved with the Cen-
tury Freeway case concluded that this approach caused unnecessary
delays and fostered animosity over relatively petty issues susceptible to
a quick judicial resolution. Besides delay, the informal approach en-
couraged ex parte communication and created potential difficulties in
finding parts of the record.
D. Spotting Bureaucratic and Political Impediments
The decree formulation process must specifically consider the bu-
reaucratic and political hurdles associated with implementation. De-
velopment of a formal implementation plan'53 and evaluations by
experts familiar with the affected bureaucracies aid in determining the
feasibility of implementation.' 54
The interviewees identified no such formal fact-finding stages.
Although the plaintiffs' attorneys considered the seven-year injunction
period as a fact-finding stage, it is not clear that any facts emerged
during that period. The Caltrans attorneys most active in the decree
negotiations either lacked knowledge of any fact-finding efforts, or they
criticized the depth and validity of the studies performed under the
agreement. The other defendants subscribed to a "backroom consulta-
tion" model of consent decree negotiation, 5 where a small group of
152. Anderson, supra note 17, at 761.
153. Stein, supra note 28, at 151.
154. Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, supra note 39, at
457, citing Johnson & Wood, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Competence in
Setting Institutional Standards, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMrrTEE ON MENTAL RE-
TARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CMZEN AND THE LAW 528, 535-40 (1976).
155. Interview with Ct-33. "Backroom Consultation" is defined as a process not
readily opened to broad involvement.
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lawyers believe that they have all the information necessary to properly
draft the decree.
A number of interviewees suggested improvements to the decree, but
they required a better fact-finding process. For example, some inter-
viewees recommended the establishment of a production-oriented
agency to lead the housing construction project. Such an agency need
not adhere to the policies and procedures designed for the management
of highway construction projects rather than housing construction
projects. The interviewees noted that the regulations relevant to a
highway construction project are not interchangeable with regulations
governing a housing construction project.
E. Detailing Defendant's Obligations
Whether a decree that contains detailed expectations for each agency
facilitates implementation or compliance with the decree is unclear.
Detailed expectations eliminate ambiguity and simplify an organiza-
tion's ability to act. However, critics of highly-detailed directives deem
them counterproductive. The detailed expectations may alienate the
agencies by eliminating agency discretion and requiring strict adher-
ence to the letter of the law, as opposed to its spirit. What's more, a
consent decree that attempts to cover all details cannot, in fact, be
exhaustive.
Most Caltrans interviewees understood their obligations under the
decree. Some felt that a more detailed explanation of their powers
under the decree would preclude any agency discretion and lead to in-
appropriate judicial administration of a state agency. 56 FHWA re-
spondents differed over the optimal amount of detail that a consent
decree should contain. Some found the Century decree too detailed.
Those individuals favored a decree with general goals, giving the imple-
menting agencies discretion over how to attain those targets. Others
fault the Century decree as leaving substantive issues open to excessive
interpretation.
Some plaintiff and CFAAC interviewees criticized the decree's fail-
ure to provide specific deadlines and adequate levels of detail. Accord-
ing to CFAAC officials, the decree permitted neglect and ultimately
delays in the plan's completion. The plaintiffs' attorneys stated that,
although it is impossible for a decree to anticipate all unforeseen cir-
156. Caltrans respondents noted the lack of an adequate description of the procure-
ment process for housing units. Uncertainty surrounded the parties' respective
responsibilities.
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cumstances, skepticism of bureaucracies justifies very detailed proce-
dures and objections. A minority of the plaintiffs' attorneys disagreed.
Rather, they sought only a statement of procedures for resolving un-
foreseen problems.
The decree contained deadlines for the phasing requirement of the
highway and housing components of the project. The decree allegedly
included these particular deadlines to ensure simultaneous progress on
both the housing program and the highway. Satisfaction of the dead-
lines became the ultimate objective, without regard to the ability of the
housing program's administrative or organizational structure to com-
ply with those deadlines.
F. Dispute Resolution
Many Caltrans respondents questioned the efficacy of the dispute
resolution agencies created under the decree. Others denied that the
decree even created dispute resolving agencies. Rather, those Caltrans
respondents who denied the existence of these agencies concluded that
the decree fostered otherwise avoidable disputes. Moreover, the decree
supplanted formal administrative review of property acquisition and
the dispensation of relocation benefits with an unwieldy adversarial
system.
CFAAC respondents criticized the lack of an independent dispute
resolution body.157 These interviewees acknowledge the judge's at-
tempt to use his staff and a special counsel as an independent dispute
resolution body. However, similar to the judge, they served as a
facilitator, assisting the parties in choosing a mutually agreeable course
of action. They did not mandate any particular course. The plaintiffs'
attorneys argued the need for such a body. One attorney theorized
that the judge declined to appoint a special master in the interest of
preserving the duties traditionally assigned to him."'
The literature recommends a different organizational strategy, the
use of a monitor whose sole authority is to gather information, assess
the defendants' compliance with the decree, report to the court, and
offer assistance in resolving minor disputes. The Century Freeway de-
157. Some CFAAC respondents saw CFAAC as a dispute resolution body; how-
ever, it lacked final authority to resolve disputes. For example, under the decree, the
Director of Caltrans has the authority to reject a decision by CFAAC, if the bid is not
responsive to consent decree requirements. Amended Final Consent Decree, app. Ex-
hibit C, supra note 2, at 26.
158. Interview with Ct-45.
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cree lacks such an organizational strategy. Interviewees identified at
least six organizations or individuals possessing "sole authority" to
monitor implementation and resolve disputes.159 The parties agreed
that the purported monitors were ineffective. However, they were not
in agreement as to the identity of the monitor or as to a better choice.
The variety of organizations and individuals mentioned as potential
monitors reflects the confusion surrounding the role of these organiza-
tions or individuals. Additionally, it reflects the judge's willingness to
allocate nominal monitoring and reporting authority to a variety of en-
tities, rather than granting a single individual or organization the status
of sole Master.
G. Non-Party Interests and Involvement
When the interests of plaintiffs and defendants are greatly divergent,
it is difficult to implement consent decrees. The absence of a common
settlement objective exacerbates these difficulties. Additional problems
arise when non-parties to the settlement become parties to implementa-
tion. The parties and non-parties often differ on important substantive
aspects of the decree. An analysis of the defendants' and the plaintiffs'
varied interests demonstrates the problem of non-party involvement in
implementation.
Although Caltrans and FHWA shared many similar interests, their
opinions differed in other areas, such as the proper funding for the spe-
cial counsel and the proper funding for reimbursement of housing pro-
gram costs. According to several interviewees, the defendants'
implementation efforts also suffered because of a lack of identifiable
and coherent structure. One official described Caltrans' structure as
internally incoherent. The director's agenda was much broader than
that of Caltrans' rank and file engineers. Another Caltrans official ex-
plained that people outside the department were unable to determine
the responsibilities of the various administrators and engineers. Under
the consent decree, even Caltrans insiders had difficulty defining indi-
vidual roles.
In addition, Caltrans was unable to identify the plaintiffs' interests
with regard to the implementation of the decree. There was no clear
process for the plaintiffs' lawyers to communicate with the original
plaintiffs. Without this means of communication, it was difficult to as-
159. The "monitors" included CFAAC; the Center for Law; The Corridor Advo-
cate; the court clerk; a special counsel, who oversaw the restructuring of the housing
program; and a "special consultant" to the court.
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certain what could be done to pursue the plaintiffs' interests. Unfortu-
nately, the litigation and consent decree processes did not provide for
effective participation of the named plaintiffs in their representation.
According to an HCD official, the project failed to fully reconcile
divergent plaintiffs' interests. Some plaintiffs held business and em-
ployment training interests, while others were concerned about housing
provision. One HCD official noted the conflict between high-level
housing production and the social goal of affirmative action.
Implementation of the consent decree was difficult, in part because
the plaintiffs altered their position. At first, the plaintiffs adamantly
opposed any freeway project. Eventually, however, the plaintiffs ex-
pressed a willingness to accept some form of corridor freeway. 160
The respondents disagreed on whether to include non-parties in de-
cree negotiations. Those who believed that non-parties deserved a role
in the negotiation process argued that people affected by the decree
were entitled to influence its provisions, especially those pertaining to
housing. To many critics, the exclusion of HCD, which did not par-
ticipate meaningfully in the negotiation of the decree, made little sense.
HCD, after all, was the agency which was going to be responsible for
implementation of one of the decree's most controversial aspects-the
several thousand unit housing program. These critics cite the exclu-
sion of HCD from the negotiation process as an explanation for some
of the organizational and financial problems plaguing the decree's
implementation. 161
Although officials of the corridor cities reviewed and commented on
the various drafts of the consent decree, they lacked any significant role
in decree negotiations. Most of corridor cities' concerns were ad-
dressed by the time the negotiators reached the drafting stage. One
city official from Downey, a city located in the freeway corridor, indi-
cated that the city's primary interest was in the continued progress of
the project. Caltrans had already satisfied all the cities' demands prior
to the lawsuit.
160. A state official noted:
They stated it right up front at the beginning .... We want to stop this project.
We want money to go to transit .... I think maybe the hand-writing was on the
wall as far as they were concerned despite their efforts to kill the project. Even
with the support of the Brown administration they were not going to do it.
161. One Center for Law attorney expressed little sympathy for HCD's desire to be
more involved: "Sure, people say, for example, that HCD was not a participant in the
drafting, and got stuck with doing some of the stuff. But my view is that they're the
State of California, and if they can't get their act together..."
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Other city officials doubted the capacity of the corridor cities to as-
sume a larger role, even if they desired. According to one city man-
ager, local elected officials and his staff lacked the sophistication
necessary to play a greater role in the decree's negotiation and imple-
mentation process.
Representatives from HCD, as well as local officials, noted the im-
portance of continuing community input in the implementation of the
housing program. These officials speculated that greater HAC partici-
pation in the implementation of the plan might have served the com-
munities better. Some thought that the disbanding of the HAC
impaired efforts to persuade local jurisdictions to accept decree-man-
dated housing projects. 62
The lack of community representation at the housing construction
phase of the decree's implementation was a disappointment. Further-
more, local officials felt that their communities lacked sufficient infor-
mation about the housing plans. There was no central control over
changes in the implementation scheme. 163
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The implementation of the Century Freeway consent decree, when
viewed in the context of organizational theory, suggests several general
conclusions that apply to the implementation of any consent decree.
Proponents of consent decrees must be realistic in assessing the po-
tential for cooperation among the organizations that are the subjects of
proposed reforms. In litigating proposed reforms, defendant agencies
often have deep and entrenched organizational cultures, which are not
easily rocked by the fiats of the judiciary, no matter how detailed or
eloquent. Even within a single jurisdiction, the organizational cultures
162. For example, the City of Hawthorne attempted to block the siting of decree
mandated housing by limiting the low income housing. The district court enjoined the
City's efforts and found the limitations to be discriminatory. See Keith v. Volpe, 618 F.
Supp. at 1160 (holding that the California Division of Highways sufficiently complied
with statutes designed to aid persons displaced by federal aid highway projects).
163. According to one city official:
Change in program design, upscaling or downscaling of a specific project, availabil-
ity or lack of availability of money for a plan [were not scrutinized.] ... Someone
should have a list of... all the inner players, the people, the court, and others in it.
Somebody should have been there in the situation saying, "change your expecta-
tions communities." If you are told that this is going to be done on time you might
have gotten ready ... to coordinate other programs to our agenda. When our
agenda changed, we should have said something to you all to bring you along...
these state agencies don't do that.
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differ across agencies. In fact, they may vary within a single organiza-
tion. Thus, efforts to compel different units, divisions, and administra-
tive agencies to cooperate in obtaining a common goal may encounter
significant resistance. The law is not impotent in directing new rela-
tions among complex organizations. Rather, efforts to coordinate va-
ried complex organizations must reflect an understanding of the
history of interorganizational relations, the potential for enhanced re-
sponsibilities within organizations, and the viability of monitoring of
compliance. Further, advocates of change must analyze the policies
and procedures of the targeted organizations in order to assess whether
they will be able to operate effectively under the new policies and pro-
cedures imposed upon them.
The mandates of a consent decree often require additional staff.
Crafters of consent decrees must assess the ability of a target organiza-
tion to attract the high quality professionals needed to execute the new
directives. For example, an agency with housing policy experience
may lack the knowledge to successfully recruit builders of housing. A
state highway agency, historically dominated by engineers, may fail in
efforts to attract leading civil rights professionals. 1"
In an ideal world of implementation, targeted defendant organiza-
tions have discernable and homogeneous interests. Here it is relatively
easy to project whether a target organization will comply with the con-
sent decree. In reality, despite common oversight, agencies might still
have divergent goals. In these circumstances, the assessment phase is
more important. Perhaps the decree should be simplified, reducing the
expectation for congenial relations among different bureaucracies.
Modest successes may benefit institutional reform more than a procla-
mation of unobtainable, grandiose objectives.
In addition to obstacles inherent in interorganizational relations,
drafters of consent decrees must recognize the existing limitations on
the processing and exchange of information. Even the best-intentioned
administrators, willing to implement a consent decree in a spirit of co-
operation, may be constrained by an inability to create, access, analyze,
and disseminate information. This inability hampers consent decree
negotiations.
Consider limitations on the role of the judiciary. Again, intentions
164. State highway departments are notable among public bureaucracies for their
hostility toward changes in civil rights and environmental regulations. See Mark H.
Rose & Bruce E. Seely, Getting the Interstate System Built: Road Engineers and the
Implementation of Public Policy, 1955-1985, 2 J. POL'Y HIsT. 23, 33 (1990).
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and judicial competencies are not the limiting factors. Rather, expecta-
tions of ongoing, continuous, harmonious reporting from the executive
to the judiciary on important matters on which the courts lack exper-
tise may be unrealistic. While monitors may be desirable in selected
circumstances, the efficacy of these roles is not clear. There are several
concerns: (1) uncertainty concerning the necessary implementation
skills for a monitor; (2) resentment concerning the monitor's authority;
and (3) the requirement for judicial scrutiny over certain aspects of
implementation.
Despite the challenges involved in implementing consent decrees,
consideration of issues related to organizational behavior increase the
likelihood of successful implementation. First, successful implementa-
tion depends on committed individuals.165 Despite severe structural
flaws and organizational constraints that impeded implementation of
the Century Freeway consent decree, many observers felt that the
"right people" could have overcome these obstacles.1 66
Second, a decree's public policy goals are best implemented when
those affected by the decree are allowed to participate in its formula-
tion. This is a basic finding in the social psychology of organizational
behavior.' 67 In the present case, most Caltrans interviewees felt ex-
cluded from the formulation of the decree. The Center for Law,
through sympathetic Brown administration officials, dictated the terms
of the decree to Caltrans. Indeed, the consent decree signed in 1979
contained virtually all of the plaintiffs' original settlement demands.
The affirmative action provisions exceeded those demands.1 68 Accord-
165. Anderson, supra note 17, at 778. Anderson's consent decree analysis con-
cerned prison reform, deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and school construction
decrees. Many interviewees agreed with Professor Anderson regarding the primacy of
this factor. Its importance was surprising, however, in light of the large number of
respondents who gained an appreciation of the role of bureaucratic rivalries and inertia
in implementing the decree. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE
WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984) (reaching a conclusion similar to Professor Anderson's).
166. Some Caltrans respondents indicated that "the vision thing" is a necessary in-
gredient to successful implementation.
167. See, ag., JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 99-
110 (1976) (participation and responses to MEPA act); WILLIAM A. MEDINA, CHANG-
ING BUREAUCRACIES (1982) (discussing management improvement and problem devel-
opment); MARSHALL W. MEYER, CHANGE IN PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES 72-96 (1979)
(discussing effects of differing variables in organizational structure).
168. Had litigation continued, it is unlikely that the decree-mandated construction
of thousands of housing units and the existence of CFAAC would be included in the
project. According to Caltrans attorneys, the decree was unusual because it awarded
the plaintiffs more than they originally demanded. The rank and file Caltrans engineers
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ing to attorneys who negotiated the decree, its basic components were
in place after the first few negotiating sessions. Some described the
negotiations as "funny" because the Caltrans Director and other senior
officials in the Brown administration generally concurred with the
Center for Law position. On most issues, the question was not whether
the Center's demands would be incorporated into the settlement, but
rather, how broad Caltrans' accedence would be. Rank and file Cal-
trans engineers and administrators, most of whom thought that plain-
tiffs' original allegations lacked merit, opposed the negotiations which
led to the signing of the consent decree. The senior administrators to
whom drafts of the consent decree were circulated lacked "veto" au-
thority over the major elements of the decree. They possessed only a
limited power to comment on the decree. 169
Resentment, derived from a perceived "imposed agreement," has
hampered efficient decree implementation. 17 According to Caltrans
officials, defendants failed to move quickly; there was significant intra-
conflicted with the decree's social goals of achieving affirmative action. Caltrans inter-
viewees regarded the agency's support for civil rights as adequate. These interviewees
acknowledged that affirmative action was never a high priority. Other Caltrans inter-
viewees criticized the department's civil rights record. One senior Caltrans official ad-
mitted that the affirmative action provision for MBEs and WBEs in the 1982 Surface
Transportation Act caught the department "flat-footed." According to interviewees,
during the years following its establishment, the department's Civil Rights Office was a
"dumping ground for incompetents." A small minority of Caltrans interviewees noted
a lack of commitment among senior Caltrans officials to civil rights programs. The lack
of commitment to civil rights hampered the operations of the District 7 Civil Rights
Branch during consent decree implementation.
169. Several heated debates occurred. Parties failed to agree on the size of the hous-
ing program, the duties of the ombudsman, the Corridor Advocate, and the lead agency
for the housing program. Initially, a majority of Caltrans interviewees approved of the
housing program's inclusion into the decree. Most felt that the housing project served
the general welfare. However, less than one-third approved of HCD as the lead agency.
Twenty percent felt the assignment promoted the general welfare. One-third of Cal-
trans interviewees identified their sister agency as an opponent in decree implementa-
tion. Caltrans' hostility toward the housing program derives primarily from a perceived
error in the assignment of various agencies to oversee implementation.
170. This point, however, is often overlooked by experts in the field of remedy. For
example, a colloquium examining judicial intervention in the management of executive
agencies focused on the administration of consent decrees. However, it left "to legal
debate" any concerns about the propriety of institutional reform litigation and resultant
consent decrees. For an extensive account of the colloquium, see ROBERT C. WOOD,
REMEDIAL LAW: WHEN COURTS BECOME ADMINISTRATORs (1990). The interviews
indicated that officials questioned the legitimacy of the settlement process among imple-
mentation officials. Consequently, their responses to the questions influenced their ad-
ministrative behavior.
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agency conflict; the defendants "selectively" complied; and at some
levels, the defendants simply opposed the decree. 171 Some felt that per-
sonnel in the state and federal transportation agencies hoped to see the
housing program fail in order to avoid the precedent of including hous-
ing as a component in future federal projects. Because defendants
widely perceived the decree as a negative aberration, several defendant
agency employees found it difficult to embrace. Compliance with the
decree conflicted with their professional advancement.1 72
Finally, advocates of consent decrees might benefit from the drafting
of detailed goals and the creation of monitoring procedures. The alter-
native of postponing the task of determining goals and monitoring pro-
cedures is incompatible with common understandings of collective
action.
171. Implementation is complicated when an implementor's attitude towards a pol-
icy differs from that of other policy-makers. See, eg., Charles S. Bullock III, Conditions
Associated with Policy Implementation, Implementation of Civil Rights Policy 184-207
(Charles S. Bullock III & Charles M. Lamb, eds., 1984); Ernest Alexander, From Idea
to Action: Notes for a Contingency Theory of the Policy Implementation Process, 16 AD-
MIN. & Soc'Y 403 (1985). In the Century Freeway case, interviewees traced its eventual
demise to changes in political administrations (from Brown to Deukmejian at the state
level, and from Carter to Reagan at the federal level). Also, the new group of decree
implementors inherited questionable programs which they philosophically opposed.
For example, a senior FHWA administrator under President Reagan called the decree
"an abomination and an abuse of the power of the judiciary." Interview F-1.
172. "There weren't real clear messages that if you made things happen on Century
Freeway that this was good for your career." Such messages can be important. Even
individuals with deeply-held beliefs that a policy is illegitimate will modify their behav-
ior when the probability is high that severe sanctions for noncompliance will be in-
voked. See, eg., Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, The Implementation of
Public Policy: a Framework of Analysis, Effective Policy Implementation 3-35 (Daniel
A. Mazmanian & Paul Sabatier, eds., 1981).
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